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Unchecked: How Frazier v. CitiFinancial Eliminated 
Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act* 
I. Introduction 
Arbitration agreements play a pivotal role in resolving civil disputes.  In an 
effort to avoid the time and expense of litigation, arbitration is often favored 
over traditional judicial remedies.1  In 1925, Congress passed the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) to provide a mechanism for arbitration award 
enforcement and to end an era of judicial hostility toward arbitration.2  Under 
the FAA, a party may have an arbitration award converted into a court order 
by a federal court through a confirmation process.3  When a federal court is 
asked to confirm an arbitration award, the FAA provides for a deferential 
review of the award and outlines specific statutory grounds for vacating the 
award.4  However, in many situations, the narrow statutory grounds for 
vacatur fail to remedy unjust arbitration awards.5  These situations highlight 
the tension between deference to arbitration awards and promotion of justice 
in the enforcement of contracts.  To ease this tension, courts have developed 
common-law grounds for vacating arbitration awards.6  While judicially 
created grounds for vacatur have not been used extensively, they have 
frequently acted as a safety valve for situations in which the interests of 
justice demanded vacatur of an arbitration award. 
In Hall Street v. Mattel, the Supreme Court recently questioned the 
validity and role of judicially-created grounds for vacatur but did not 
                                                                                                                 
 * The author dedicates this note to Erin.  The author also wishes to thank University of 
Oklahoma College of Law Associate Dean Emily H. Meazell, Professor Steven Gensler, and 
Professor Elizabeth Bangs for their advice, support, and encouragement during the writing of 
this note. 
 1. Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?, 4 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 231, 231 (1999). 
 2. See id. at 245. 
 3. 9 U.S.C § 9 (2006). 
 4. Id. § 10(a); Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 1, at 232. 
 5. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); Montes v. 
Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 6. See Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration 
Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008) (exploring the contradictions in arbitration law and the 
non-statutory grounds for vacatur which have been created since the passage of the Federal 
Arbitration Act). 
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ultimately resolve the question.7  Hall Street’s ambiguity has fueled ongoing 
disagreements among courts as to the extent of the judiciary’s authority to 
vacate awards under the FAA.8  One interpretation of Hall Street, which 
would significantly alter current legal norms, permits courts to vacate 
arbitration awards only when statutory grounds for vacatur are satisfied.9  
Other courts accept expansively interpret § 10(a)(4) of the FAA to include 
judicially-created grounds for vacatur.10  As a result, circuit courts are split as 
to the viability and application of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the 
FAA. 
The 2010 Eleventh Circuit decision in Frazier v. CitiFinancial illustrates 
the error of the former interpretation of Hall Street and illuminates the 
dangers of such changes in the law.11  The Frazier court interpreted Hall 
Street to mean that “§§ 9-11 represent the exclusive grounds for vacatur 
under the FAA.”12 Although the Eleventh Circuit asserted that it was 
following relevant precedent, it improperly construed the scope of Hall Street 
and, in so doing, eliminated a valuable safeguard to the integrity of the 
arbitration system: judicially-created grounds for vacatur.  Further, the 
Frazier court’s use of unsubstantiated policy justifications in support of the 
decision highlights judicial misconceptions regarding both the effect of non-
statutory grounds for vacatur on judicial efficiency and the existence of a 
national policy favoring arbitration.  This decision, intended to simplify the 
application of the FAA, ultimately leaves parties in the Eleventh Circuit at 
the unbridled mercy of sometimes arbitrary arbitrators. 
 This note analyzes the Frazier decision in four parts.  Part II provides a 
review of the law surrounding the FAA, including the Hall Street decision.   
Part III discusses the facts, issue, rationale, and decision in Frazier.  Part IV 
conducts an in-depth analysis of the Frazier decision by (1) outlining the 
importance of judicially created grounds for vacatur to public confidence in 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008). 
 8. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 9. E.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“We conclude that Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in § 10 of the 
[FAA], and consequently, manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for 
vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“We have already determined that the manifest disregard ground for vacatur is 
shorthand for a statutory ground under the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which states 
that the court may vacate where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”) (internal citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 11. 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 12. Id. at 1324 (emphasis added). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/6
2012] NOTES 237 
 
 
the arbitration system and highlighting the need for judicially created grounds 
for vacatur as a public policy check on the arbitration system; (2) explaining 
how congressional intent is best served by the preservation of judicially 
created grounds for vacatur; (3) demonstrating how contract law can be used 
to support the utility of judicially created grounds for vacatur; (4) analyzing 
the narrow scope of the Hall Street holding; and (5) critiquing the notion that 
there is a substantive national policy favoring arbitration.  Part V concludes 
this note by arguing that judicially created grounds for vacatur should be 
preserved because they are critical to maintaining the vitality of the 
arbitration system.    
II. The Law Preceding the Case 
Congress enacted the FAA during a time when the judicial branch 
consistently refused to enforce arbitration awards.13  Courts perceived 
arbitration as a form of judicial outsourcing that could lead to unjust results.14  
In an attempt to eliminate judicial hostility toward arbitration awards, 
Congress enacted the FAA as a clear mandate requiring courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements but included several very narrow statutory grounds for 
vacatur.15  While these statutory grounds for vacatur addressed the most 
obvious procedural concerns, they did not apply to mistakes of fact or law.16  
To make matters worse, courts initially interpreting the FAA created 
common-law rules discouraging vacatur and requiring that courts make all 
inferences necessary to confirm arbitration awards.17  Consequently, an 
inflexible system of judicial review emerged that left judges helpless to 
correct awards based on errors of fact or law.  Over time, however, the 
sensitive nature of labor dispute arbitration led to a less deferential review of 
arbitration awards and the creation of non-statutory grounds for vacatur as 
mechanisms for vacating unjust arbitration awards.18  This section outlines 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute 
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 263 (2003) 
(explaining the sense of early courts that all citizens should have the right to a full adjudication 
and the ability to withdraw from arbitration and enter litigation at will prior to the FAA). 
 14. See id. 
 15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
 16. Id. § 10. 
 17. See Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 
1935); Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
 18. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 
(1960); W. Elec. Co. v. Commc’n Equip. Workers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Md. 1976). 
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the evolution of the FAA and judicial interpretation thereof, starting with the 
FAA’s enactment and concluding with the current state of the law. 
A. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925  
1. History and Congressional Intent 
Congress adopted the FAA in response to a long period of judicial 
resistance to enforcing arbitration agreements.19  The FAA sent a clear 
message to the judicial branch that judicial hostility toward arbitration must 
end.20  Congress passed the FAA to “reduc[e] [the] technicality, delay and 
expense to a minimum and at the same time safeguard[] the rights of the 
parties.”21  At the time, a large portion of the support for the FAA came from 
trade associations wishing to limit their litigation expenses.22  The parties 
believed arbitration was more predictable and efficient.23  Until the enactment 
of the FAA, courts had allowed either party to avoid arbitration with relative 
ease.24  Parties could avoid arbitration at any time simply by moving the 
dispute into formal litigation.25  Thus, Congress enacted the FAA to further 
validate arbitration agreements by denying a party the ability to unilaterally 
disregard the arbitration agreement in favor of formal litigation.26   
                                                                                                                 
 19. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 55 (2007). 
 20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“It has been made clear by the Supreme Court, this court and other courts that the ancient 
judicial hostility to arbitration is a thing of the past.”).   
 21. Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens Next, 31 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273, 274 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-
96, at 2 (1924)).  
 22. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Coklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 409 n.2 (1967) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (“The principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in 
groceries and other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in the major 
trading centers.”). 
 23. See Cheryl Aptowitzer, Note, Arbitration – Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards – 
Courts May Review and Vacate an Arbitration Award Where an Arbitrator Commits Gross, 
Unmistakable, or Not Reasonably Debatable Errors of Law or Where the Arbitrator Manifestly 
Disregards the Law and the Result is Unjust – Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 
129 N.J. 479, 610 A.2d 364 (1992), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 998, 998-1000 (1993). 
 24. Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights under the Federal Arbitration Act: 
The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157, 169 n.46 (1989) (citing Paul L. Sayre, 
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595 (1928)) (explaining that 
before the enactment of the FAA, courts commonly abided by the “ouster” doctrine:  “The 
effect of the ‘ouster’ doctrine was that a party who had agreed to arbitrate a future dispute 
could withdraw without an effective sanction anytime before the final award.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/6
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Congress not only sought to provide a more efficient method for dispute 
resolution but also hoped to promote freedom of contract.  The FAA codifies 
the freedom of private parties to reach enforceable agreements representing 
the parties’ consensual will.27  Parties often view arbitration as a less 
burdensome and more predictable means of dispute resolution.28  A core 
value of arbitration is that parties are the owners of their disputes and should 
be able to direct the resolution as they see fit.29  This explains why courts 
have consistently relied on the principle of contractual freedom to justify 
judicial deference to arbitration awards. 
The FAA provides a framework that allows for enforcement of arbitration 
awards.  Many courts and commentators believe the provisions “establish a 
strong national policy in favor of arbitration.”30  Others, however, argue that 
the text of the FAA—read in combination with the congressional intent—
simply elevates arbitration agreements to the same level as other contracts.31  
Indeed, many courts have found no national policy favoring arbitration in the 
FAA.32  As discussed below, the debate over whether there is a national 
policy favoring arbitration proves crucial to understanding the Frazier court’s 
holding.33 
2. The Framework Established by the FAA for Arbitration Enforcement 
The FAA is divided into three chapters, with the first sixteen sections 
compiled in the first chapter.34  For purposes of this note, the most relevant 
sections are §§ 9 and 10.35  Section 9 provides that within a year of the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. David K. Kessler, Why Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest for Efficiency in 
Arbitration After Hall Street Associates, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 77, 82-83 (2009). 
 28. Id. 
 29. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 4-5 
(2006); see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:  A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (exploring the 
notion that each individual dispute has characteristics that make it suitable for a particular 
method of resolution, including arbitration or litigation, which should ultimately be decided by 
the parties involved in the dispute). 
 30. Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 933 (2010). 
 31. See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009). 
 32. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 
(1989); Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009);  see 
also Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).  
 33. Infra Part IV.D.2. 
 34. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
 35. The other sections pertain to maritime transactions, validity of the arbitration 
agreement, the procedure for compelling arbitration under a valid agreement, the appointment 
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issuance of an arbitration award it may be confirmed by a district court.36  
Thus, the arbitration award transforms into a court-ordered judgment.37  The 
court may refuse to confirm an arbitration award, however, if one of four 
specifically defined grounds for vacatur in § 10 of the FAA exists.38 
The first statutory ground for vacating an arbitration award provides for 
vacatur “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means.”39  The next enumerated ground allows a court to vacate an award 
where the arbitrator is biased in favor of a party or corrupt.40  These two 
grounds police outright defects in the arbitration process, such as bribes, 
various forms of intimidation, and threats of violence.41  The drafters of the 
FAA appeared to be heavily concerned that corruption could ultimately 
undermine the legitimacy of arbitration awards. 
The third provision providing for vacatur of an arbitration award addresses 
procedural and evidentiary concerns.42  A district court may vacate a 
judgment if arbitrators “refus[ed] to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown” or “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy.”43  Moreover, the FAA includes a clause designed to thwart 
other procedural defects: when “misbehavior by which the rights of any party 
have been prejudiced [occurs],” vacatur is proper.44  Arbitrators are not held 
to the same procedural standards that apply in judicial proceedings; a court 
simply reviews the arbitration for violations of minimal fairness safeguards.45  
On balance, parties in judicial proceedings enjoy far better protections than 
parties in arbitration. 46 
The fourth ground for vacatur under § 10 of the FAA proves to be the 
most important because many courts have interpreted it to include judicially-
created grounds for vacatur.  Section 10(a)(4) provides for vacatur “[w]here 
                                                                                                                 
of arbitrators, fees, compelling attendance, and other procedures under the FAA.  
 36. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (“[A]t any time within one year after the award is made any party to the 
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and 
thereupon the court must grant such an order . . . .”). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. § 10. 
 39. Id. § 10(a)(1). 
 40. Id. § 10(a)(2) (providing for vacatur “where there was evident partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrators...”). 
 41. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 78. 
 42. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.   
 45. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 78. 
 46. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
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the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.”47  Courts have often applied this ground where arbitrators ruled on 
matters not submitted to arbitration.48  Section 10(a)(4) has also applied in 
cases where an arbitrator has not provided a ruling to the parties that would 
be helpful in resolving the dispute.49  As discussed later, the ambiguous 
language of § 10(a)(4), which allows courts to interpret it to include judicially 
created grounds for vacatur, is pivotal to the protection of judicially created 
grounds for vacatur in many jurisdictions. 
Judicial interpretation of the four statutory grounds for vacatur has 
significantly limited when unjust arbitration awards may be vacated pursuant 
to the FAA.  In order to preserve the integrity of arbitration awards and avoid 
re-litigating disputes, courts have consistently limited the statutory grounds 
for vacatur.  As a result, judicially crafted rules give great deference to 
arbitration awards, even when the awards are based on inaccurate facts or 
inapplicable legal authority.  
In-depth reviews by courts, while outside of the review permitted by the 
FAA, appeared to receive the Supreme Court’s endorsement in Wilko v. 
Swan.50  In Wilko, the Court announced the first judicially-created ground for 
vacatur: manifest disregard for the law.51  The Wilko Court explained that 
“the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest 
disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review 
for error in interpretation.”52  The Court reasoned if an arbitrator is simply 
interpreting the law, then the arbitration award should not be vacated.53  
However, where an arbitrator completely disregards the law on which the 
award should be based, courts have the power to vacate the arbitration 
award.54  The Wilko decision could have signaled a significant reduction in 
judicial deference to unjust arbitration awards.  But despite Wilko’s apparent 
recognition of/endorsement of common-law grounds for vacatur, courts 
largely continued to strictly construe the statutory grounds. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
 48. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 78. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
 51. See, e.g., O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 
1988) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
 52. 346 U.S. at 436-37. 
 53. See, e.g., O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 
1988) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
 54. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496, 501 (M.D. Fla. 1992). 
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B. Limited Application of Statutory Grounds for Vacatur Under the FAA 
Hoping to preserve the finality of arbitration awards and fearing that an 
expansive review might permit frivolous attempts by losing parties to have 
awards set aside,55 courts have narrowly applied the statutory grounds for 
vacatur.56  Consistent with long-standing deference to arbitration awards, 
courts voluntarily narrowed the scope of judicial review of arbitration 
awards.57  The Supreme Court went so far as to conclude that parties who 
contracted into arbitration agreements were “willing to accept less 
certainty.”58  Thus, courts interpreted the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur 
very narrowly—even creating judicial rules reflective of this interpretation. 
In order to promote finality, courts created rules advancing a deferential 
approach to judicial review of arbitration awards.  In Fine v. Bear, Stearns & 
Co., the Southern District of New York concluded that “[i]t is well-settled 
that a court’s power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely limited 
because an overly expansive judicial review of arbitration awards would 
undermine the litigation efficiencies which arbitration seeks to achieve.”59  
Likewise in Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, the Fourth 
Circuit noted that, in order to avoid substituting its judgment for the judgment 
of the arbitrator, a court should utilize every reasonable presumption in favor 
of upholding the outcome of the arbitration.60  In short, the courts constructed 
rules that made it incredibly difficult for parties to vacate arbitration awards 
under the statutory provisions of the FAA, even where the result was unjust. 
Extreme deference to arbitration awards routinely prompted courts to 
confirm awards even when the arbitrator applied incorrect law or made 
clearly erroneous findings of fact.  Courts concluded that even a clear mistake 
of law or fact is not sufficient to disturb an arbitration award.61  As a general 
policy, “non-reviewability [of the application of the facts to the law] remains 
the general rule . . . and exceptions are few and far between.”62  Thus, judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 55. E.g., Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853, 860-61 (W.D.S.C. 
1957).   
 56. Id. at 206. 
 57. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 345 (1854). 
 58. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
 59. Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).   
 60. 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 1935) (“It is well established that every reasonable 
presumption will be indulged to sustain an award . . . .”). 
 61. Salt Lake Pressmen & Platemakers, Local Union No. 28 v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 
485 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Utah 1980); see Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Wash. 
Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 62. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Bettencourt v. Bos. 
Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977)). 
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interpretations of the FAA not only supported the finality of arbitration 
awards, but also preserved Congressional intent to provide a highly 
deferential review.63  Nevertheless, courts occasionally found arbitration 
awards so erroneous that they refused to confirm them.  The courts’ refusal to 
confirm unjust arbitration awards led to the emergence of judicially created 
grounds for vacatur.   
C. The Emergence of Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur 
Judicially created grounds for vacatur originated in the context of labor 
dispute arbitration between union workers and employers.  Eight years after 
Wilko, the sensitive nature of these disputes prompted the Supreme Court to 
announce a less deferential review of labor arbitration awards.64  In 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, the Supreme Court 
expressed concerns that arbitrators may deviate from collective bargaining 
agreements and “dispense [their] own brand of industrial justice.”65  The 
Steelworkers Court reasoned that an arbitration “award is legitimate only so 
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”66  As 
the “essence test” gained momentum, courts explored its exact parameters.  
In clarifying the “essence test,” courts took language from Steelworkers and 
expanded upon it—attempting to craft a more specific and workable standard 
of review.67  As a result, courts started stepping away from the bright-line 
rule that arbitration awards would not be vacated because of mistakes of fact 
or law.  Instead, courts began to certify arbitration awards unless they lacked 
any basis in fact or law or the award was not within the essence of the 
contract.68  The “essence test” became the first step toward judicially created 
grounds for vacatur.69 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal 
Arbitration Awards:  Hall Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 605-06 (2009). 
 64. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 202. 
 65. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
 66. Id. 
 67. W. Elec. Co. v. Commc’n Equip. Workers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Md. 1976) 
(noting that the “‘essence’ test lack[ed] sufficient specificity to provide lower courts with a 
consistent and workable standard in exercising their function of review”) (quoting Local 1852 
Waterfront Guard Ass’n v. Amstar Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Md. 1973)). 
 68. Id. at 169 (emphasis omitted) (announcing a new test which would support an 
arbitration agreement “unless it lacks any facts to support it or unless it is not within the 
essence of the contract”). 
 69. Id. 
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In the 1970s, courts vigilantly attempted to ensure the merit of arbitration 
awards, which resulted a less deferential standard of review for arbitration 
awards.70  In Timken Co. v. Local Union No. 1123, United Steelworkers of 
America, the employer sought to vacate an award in favor of an employee 
who was terminated after incarceration prevented him from attending work.71  
The arbitrator concluded that the employee should be reinstated on the basis 
of impermissible discrimination: explaining that because the employer freely 
granted leave in cases of illness or injury, an employee serving jail time 
should also be granted leave.72  Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit vacated the 
arbitration award.73  It maintained that when arbitrators go “beyond th[e] 
testimony and the record” to reach a conclusion, arbitration awards lack the 
force of law.74 
Steelworkers and Timken illustrate a move toward judicial review of the 
merits of arbitration awards.  This approach was diametrically opposed to the 
long-standing deference given to arbitration agreements by the federal court 
system.  After Steelworkers, even where courts recited standards that 
recognized extreme deference to the arbitration awards, they often conducted 
a detailed analysis of the arbitrators’ reasoning and of the results.75  For 
example, in Western Electric Co. v. Communication Equipment Workers, 
Inc., the federal district court in Maryland purported to undertake a highly 
deferential review.76  Yet the court reviewed the arbitrator’s decision with 
regard to each issue and scrutinized the reasoning behind the results.77  This 
type of merits-based review of the facts and circumstances underlying an 
award exceeded the limited facial review that courts normally performed on 
an arbitration award.  In other words, while Western Electric purported to be 
very deferential in its recitation of the standard of review, its actual analysis 
explored the merits of the arbitration award—leaving the court free to vacate 
the award if it was clearly erroneous.  In time, courts allowed this merits-
based sentiment to extend beyond labor arbitration awards.78 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel:  Court 
Review of Punitive Awards in Labor and Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
199, 209-10 (2006). 
 71. 482 F.2d 1012, 1013 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 72. Id. at 1014. 
 73. Id. at 1014-15. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See W. Elec. Co. v. Commc’n Equip. Workers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Md. 
1976). 
 76. Id. at 178. 
 77. See id. at 177-78. 
 78. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 202. 
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D. Acceptance of Manifest Disregard and Public Policy Grounds for Vacatur 
In recent years, many circuit courts recognized manifest disregard—first 
recognized in Wilko v. Swan, 79 as an additional ground for vacatur.80  In 
McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Markets, the First Circuit explained that 
“[c]ourts do . . . retain a very limited power to review arbitration awards 
outside of section 10.”81  The McCarthy court defined manifest disregard of 
the law as a situation “where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator 
recognized the applicable law—and then ignored it.”82  In sum, manifest 
disregard began to function as a judicial safety valve in situations where the 
arbitration award was clearly erroneous as a matter of law.  
The labor cases not only recognized manifest disregard as a ground for 
vacatur, but also fostered a new attitude regarding enforcement of arbitration 
awards.83  Between the 1970s and Hall Street in 2008?, courts were no longer 
willing to enforce arbitration awards that were unjust; rather, courts sought to 
establish “a floor for judicial review of arbitration awards below which 
parties cannot require courts to go, no matter how clear the parties’ 
intentions.”84  In subsequent decisions, courts began to define the types of 
arbitration awards that were unjust and consequently unenforceable.   
This change in deference was especially evident when enforcement would 
be contrary to public policy.  As with other contracts, courts deemed vacatur 
proper when enforcement would not promote good public policy.85  This 
public policy sentiment was echoed in a line of lower court cases.86  For 
example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate an 
arbitrator’s reinstatement of an employee in Misco, Inc. v. United 
Paperworkers International Union on public policy grounds.87  In Misco, an 
employer terminated an employee, whose job required the operation of 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 234 (2007). 
 80. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008). 
 81. 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Advest v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 
1990)) (internal citations omitted). 
 82. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 83. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (deciding that a balance between arbitration contract 
integrity and the rights of individuals to seek redress in the courts should be adjusted to 
promote justice).  
 84. Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 85. In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of Rubber Workers of 
America, the Supreme Court held that a court must not enforce an arbitration award that is 
contrary to public policy.  461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). 
 86. E.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1191 (3d Cir. 
1993).  
 87. See Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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dangerous machinery, after discovering the employee in his car smoking 
marijuana on his break.88  The Fifth Circuit emphasized the public policy 
“against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.”89   
The Third Circuit also relied on public policy grounds to vacate an 
arbitration award in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seaman’s Union. 90  In 
Exxon Shipping Co., an arbitrator reinstated an employee after the employee 
was discharged for being intoxicated while on duty.91  The Third Circuit 
reasoned that an owner or operator of dangerous equipment should not be 
forced to reinstate an employee to a safety-sensitive position when the 
employee had been dismissed for being under the influence while on duty.92  
However, even in cases in which public policy compelled a court to vacate an 
arbitration award, the tension between promoting a national policy favoring 
arbitration and judicial infringement “upon the arbitrators’ decisional 
sovereignty” was present. 93 
While preserving the integrity of the judicial system with judicially created 
grounds for vacatur seems logical, commentators fear that incorporating 
judicially created grounds for vacatur into FAA arbitration confirmations 
“contradicts the gravamen of the legislation and the judicial policy that 
underpins it.”94  These commentators believe that adding further grounds for 
vacatur will lead to a decrease in arbitration efficiency and predictability—
two of the most important attributes of arbitration.95  The Supreme Court 
could have resolved this confusion in Hall Street but declined to do so. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street to resolve the issue of 
contractually expanding the standard of review for arbitration agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 741. 
 89. Id. at 743. 
 90. 11 F.3d at 1191. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1194. 
 93. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 203. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A] court’s 
power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely limited because an overly expansive 
judicial review of arbitration awards would undermine the litigation efficiencies which 
arbitration seeks to achieve.”); see Martin A. Feigenbaum, Development Bank of Philippines v. 
Chemtex Fibers, Inc.: A vote in Favor of International Comity and Commercial Predictability, 
21 INT’L LAW. 873, 876 (1987) (“Congress, by passing the [Federal Arbitration] Act, intended 
as its principal goal to give predictability to the legitimate expectations of those who agree to 
arbitration . . . .”). 
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under the FAA.96  The decision in Hall Street left lower courts wondering 
what, if anything, was actually resolved. 
E. Hall Street v. Mattel 
In the wake of uncertainty regarding the availability of judicially created 
grounds for vacatur under the FAA, the Supreme Court sought to clear up a 
circuit split over whether the parties could contractually expand judicial 
review of arbitration awards in Hall Street v. Mattel.97  Hall Street centered 
around a landlord-tenant dispute over an indemnification clause.98  The 
indemnification clause provided that Mattel, the tenant, would indemnify its 
landlord, Hall Street, for the cost that resulted from Mattel’s failure to follow 
applicable environmental laws.99  In addition, the lease included a provision 
that required the district court to “vacate, modify, or correct any award [if] 
the arbitrator's conclusions of law [were] erroneous.”100  Essentially, this 
provision provided protection for both parties in the event that an arbitrator 
incorrectly applied the law.   
In 1998, after high levels of chemical deposits were discovered in the 
property’s water well, Mattel agreed to clean up the property.101  In 2001, 
Mattel sought to terminate its lease, but Hall Street resisted because it had not 
yet been indemnified for the site clean up.102  The matter proceeded to federal 
court and, although the court ruled on the issues of lease termination, the 
parties agreed to arbitrate the indemnification issue.103  Subsequently, the 
arbitrator found in favor of Mattel, reasoning that “no indemnification was 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Oberwager v. McKechnie Ltd., 351 F. App’x 708, 710 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street to resolve “a split of authority among the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether parties to agreements subject to the FAA could 
supplement by contract the standards for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards set 
forth in §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA”). 
 97. 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that “manifest disregard of the law is no 
longer an ‘independent, non-statutory ground’ for setting aside an arbitration award”) (quoting 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); see Comedy Club, 
Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “manifest 
disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award under § 10(a)(4) 
of the Federal Arbitration Act”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 
94-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (manifest disregard doctrine is “a judicial gloss on the specific grounds 
for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA”). 
 98. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 579. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
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due, because the lease obligation to follow all applicable federal, state, and 
local environmental laws did not require compliance with the testing 
requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (Oregon Act); that 
Act the arbitrator characterized as dealing with human health as distinct from 
environmental contamination.”104  Believing the arbitrator incorrectly applied 
Oregon law, Hall Street moved to vacate the award; and the district court 
vacated the award.105  Upon remand, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Hall 
Street, finding that Mattel’s failure to comply with Oregon drinking water 
protection laws required Mattel to indemnify Hall Street pursuant to the 
indemnification clause.106  Mattel then appealed to the district court and cited 
a recently-decided Ninth Circuit opinion holding that contractually modified 
grounds for review were unenforceable under the FAA.107  The Ninth Circuit 
agreed and ordered the district court to reinstate the original arbitration 
award.108  The district court, however, did not reinstate the original award; 
instead, the district court ruled in favor of Hall Street and held that the 
arbitrator’s lease interpretation was not plausible and exceeded the 
arbitrator’s authority under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA.109  After the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the decision for a second time, the Supreme Court granted review in 
the case to decide whether parties are allowed to extend judicial review under 
the FAA by contract.110 
The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that §§ 10 and 11 
respectively outline the “exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and 
modification” under the FAA.111  The Court’s reasoning was simple:  the 
FAA cannot be read in a way that allows for judicially created exceptions.112  
The Court explained, “Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see 
the three provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring 
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s 
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”113  Seemingly concerned 
about maintaining the finality of arbitration agreements, the Court continued, 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at 580. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
 108. Id. at 581. 
 109. Id. at 581 n.1. 
 110. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted 
550 U.S. 968 (2007). 
 111. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584. 
 112. Id. at 588. 
 113. Id. 
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“[a]ny other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary 
appeals that can rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more 
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.”114  The Hall 
Street decision created confusion among lower courts with regard to 
judicially-created exceptions because the scope of the holding was not clearly 
defined.115  
F. The Aftermath: Interpreting Hall Street v. Mattel 
While Hall Street held that parties may not expand the depth of review in 
district court by contract, the Court’s rationale also calls into question the 
existence of judicially created grounds for vacatur.  Consequently, a circuit 
split emerged as to the validity of judicially created grounds for vacatur.  
Circuit courts confronted with arbitration award confirmation cases have 
found application of Hall Street difficult.  In Kashner Davidson Securities 
Corp. v. Mscisz, the First Circuit Court of Appeals aptly concluded that the 
vitality of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA presents a 
difficult issue that courts have only started resolving.116 
In one of the first cases following Hall Street, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corporation, the Second Circuit cited Hall Street 
for the proposition that excessive interference with arbitration awards would 
diminish the utility of arbitration agreements by preventing disputes from 
being resolved straightaway.117  However, when the same case reached the 
Supreme Court, the Court declined to address the issue: “We do not decide 
whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as an 
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated 
grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”118  Assuredly, this language 
only complicates application of judicially created grounds for vacatur.  
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th 
Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115.  
 116. 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that “manifest disregard of the law is no 
longer an ‘independent, non-statutory ground’ for setting aside an arbitration award”) (quoting 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009);  see Comedy Club, 
Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “manifest 
disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award under § 10(a)(4) 
of the Federal Arbitration Act”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 
94-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (manifest disregard doctrine is “a judicial gloss on the specific grounds 
for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA”). 
 117. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 548 F.3d at 92. 
 118. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 n.3 (2010). 
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The Sixth Circuit held that Hall Street does not limit the ability of courts to 
vacate a judgment under the FAA in Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.119  
The court interpreted the holding of Hall Street to be limited to instances 
where the parties attempt to contractually expand the grounds for vacatur 
under the FAA.120  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the “Supreme Court 
significantly reduced the ability of federal courts to vacate arbitration awards 
for reasons other than those specified in 9 U.S.C. § 10, but it did not foreclose 
federal courts’ review for an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.”121 
In Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, the Ninth Circuit reached 
the same conclusion on alternative grounds.  The court incorporated manifest 
disregard for the law into the statutory scheme under § 10 (a)(4) of the FAA.  
As explained above, this section gives a district court the power to vacate an 
award where the arbitrator “exceeded [his] powers” or “so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award . . . was not made.”122  
The court reasoned that an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he manifestly 
disregards the law.123 Other circuits, however, have moved away from 
judicially created grounds for vacatur. 
Both the Fifth and Eight Circuits have completely eliminated judicially 
created grounds for vacatur.124  In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v Bacon, 
the Fifth Circuit explained,  “Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to 
those set forth in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.”125  With this single 
sentence, the Fifth Circuit eliminated manifest disregard as a valid ground for 
vacatur under the FAA.126  The Citigroup court concluded that the practice of 
affording substantial deference to arbitration awards is not only consistent 
with the FAA but is also consistent with the practices of courts of equity 
before the enactment of the FAA.127  Providing only a passing reference to 
the circumstances that led to the adoption of non-statutory grounds for 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 120. See id. (explaining that the Hall Street court “held that the FAA does not allow private 
parties to supplement by contract the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration 
award”). 
 121. Id. at 418. 
 122. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006);  see Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 
1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 123. See Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290. 
 124. See Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 
2010); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 125. 562 F.3d at 350. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 350-51. 
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vacatur, the Citigroup court concluded that the elimination of non-statutory 
grounds for vacatur was not “revolutionary.”128   
The Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have yet to address the scope of 
Hall Street.129  Because it was not necessary to the disposition of cases, each 
court has so far declined to address the scope of Hall Street.  In fact, the 
Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue at all.  The inconsistencies among 
courts leave lower courts and practitioners unsure about the state of judicially 
created grounds for vacatur.  In 2010, however, the Eleventh Circuit weighed 
in on the issue and determined that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Hall 
Street eliminated judicially created grounds for vacatur under the FAA.   
III. Frazier v. CitiFinancial 
A. Facts 
In April 2000, John Frazier received a home equity loan from HomeSense 
Financial Corporation of Alabama.130  During the course of the transaction, 
Mr. Frazier signed a binding arbitration agreement requiring any dispute 
arising from the loan to be submitted to arbitration.131  In addition, Mr. 
Frazier forged his wife’s signature on the loan agreement.132  The arbitration 
agreement specifically provided that the contract would be “governed by the 
Federal Arbitration Act.”133  The loan was assigned several times to different 
financial services companies and eventually landed in the hands of 
CitiFinancial.134  Mr. Frazier used part of the loan to pay existing credit card 
balances and other unrelated debts.135  He did not mention the loan to Mrs. 
Frazier and had all loan documents sent to his P.O. box in an apparent 
attempt to conceal the transaction from his wife.136  Claiming the loan 
transaction was fraudulent, Mr. Frazier stopped making loan payments in 
November of 2006.137  Shortly thereafter, the Fraziers sought to have the 
contract rescinded in state court under the theories of breach of contract, 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 350.                                                                                                                                                                                       
 129. See Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, L.L.C. v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172 
(3d Cir. 2010); Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 130. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1316. 
 134. Id. at 1317. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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fraud, and misrepresentation.138  The Fraziers contended that they believed 
the loan given was unsecured.139  After the case was filed in state court, 
CitiFinancial removed the case from state court to federal court and moved to 
compel arbitration under the agreement.140  Although the Fraziers attempted 
to avoid arbitration by contesting the validity of the contract, the district court 
granted CitiFinancial’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.141  After a two-day 
arbitration, the following decision was reached:  (1) “Mrs. Frazier’s signature 
on the mortgage had been forged, but Mr. Frazier voluntarily entered into the 
secured loan transaction and therefore owed all sums specified in the note”; 
and (2) the “TILA, fraud, slander to title, and rescission claims were 
unavailing because the Fraziers failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that HomeSense, or the lawyer who conducted the closing, were 
agents or associates of CitiFinancial.”142  The arbitrator “awarded $38,706.93 
in damages for breach of the promissory note and $9,250.19 in attorneys’ 
fees.” 143  The arbitrator also attached a lien to the Fraziers’ home for the total 
sum of the award.144 
B. Procedural History 
On September 11, 2008, the district court reviewed and confirmed the 
award.145  The court held that the Fraziers could not appeal to an arbitration 
panel because their claim did not involve a sufficient amount in 
controversy.146  Moreover, the Court concluded that the Fraziers failed to 
raise grounds “justifying vacatur and/or modification of the arbitration award 
under the FAA . . . .”147  Subsequently, the Fraziers asked the court to 
reconsider its previous ruling on the following grounds:  
1) the award was subject to vacatur under § 10(a)(4) because the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority in granting CitiFinancial an 
equitable lien because CitiFinancial did not request such relief; 
2) the award was subject to modification and/or correction under 
§ 11(b) because in granting CitiFinancial an equitable lien, the 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1318. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1319. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/6
2012] NOTES 253 
 
 
arbitrator decided a matter not submitted to him; 3) the award 
was subject to modification and/or correction under § 11(c) 
because the arbitrator’s decision . . . was ‘subject to multiple 
interpretations’ and ‘thus imperfect’; 4) [the award should be 
vacated under non-statutory, judicially created grounds]; 5) the 
Fraziers were entitled to a de novo appeal before a three-
arbitrator panel; and 6) Mrs. Frazier was not bound by the 
arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate her 
claims.148   
The district court refused to vacate the arbitration award and the Fraziers 
appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit.149 
C. Decision of the Case 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision hinged on the grounds available for 
vacatur under the FAA and the assumption that FAA created a national 
policy favoring arbitration.  The court began its analysis by describing the 
statutory grounds available under §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.150  The court then 
explained that the district court must affirm the arbitration award unless one 
of four statutory grounds for vacatur exists.151   
After outlining statutory grounds for vacatur, the court added, “[t]here is a 
presumption under the FAA that arbitration awards will be confirmed, and 
federal courts should defer to an arbitrator’s decision whenever possible.”152  
The court then began to analyze the case using the statutory framework, 
concluding that none of the statutory bases for vacatur under the FAA applied 
to the Fraziers’ case.153 
After concluding no statutory basis for vacatur applied, the court engaged 
in a discussion of judicially created grounds for vacatur—specifically 
focusing on the manifest disregard and arbitrary and capricious standards and 
public policy grounds for vacatur.154  Looking first to precedent from the 
Eleventh Circuit, the court noted that these three grounds had been 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 1321. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006)). 
 152. Id. (citing B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909 (11th 
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. Id. at 1321. 
 154. Id. at 1322. 
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recognized in prior cases.155  In order to determine whether those precedents 
had been overruled, however, the court carefully scrutinized Hall Street. 
The Eleventh Circuit discussed Hall Street in several different contexts.  
First, it acknowledged that Hall Street addressed the issue of “whether the 
statutory bases for vacatur of an arbitrator’s award set forth in § 10 may be 
supplemented by contract.”156  The Eleventh Circuit noted that in Hall Street, 
the Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding “that §§ 10 
and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited 
vacatur and modification.”157  Up to this point, the court discussed Hall Street 
in the context of contractual expansion of the grounds for review under the 
FAA. The court then shifted its focus, however, and interpreted the scope of 
Hall Street to encompass a much broader set of circumstances. 
The Frazier court interpreted Hall Street as eliminating all judicially 
created grounds for vacatur.  Quoting Hall Street, the Frazier court 
emphasized that the language of the FAA “carries no hint of flexibility” and 
that the text of the statute instructs a court “to grant confirmation in all cases, 
except when one of the prescribed exceptions applies.”158  The Frazier court 
read this language to require the expansion of the holding of Hall Street 
beyond contractual expansions of the grounds for vacatur and into the realm 
of all judicially created grounds for vacatur under the FAA.159  The Frazier 
court reasoned that permitting common law grounds for vacatur would 
eventually lead to expansive litigation and defeat the express purpose of the 
FAA—expediting the resolution of disputes.160 
The Frazier court recognized that Hall Street does not explicitly apply to 
judicially created expansions of §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA, but the court cited 
a number of other circuits’ interpretations as support for concluding that 
judicially created grounds for vacatur cannot survive.161  Even after citing 
circuit cases that did not eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur, the 
Frazier court concluded that the categorical language of Hall Street requires 
courts to eliminate all such grounds.162 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. (citing B.L. Harbert Int’l, 441 F.3d at 909). 
 156. Id. (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 157. Id. (citing Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584, 587) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The court affirmed the ruling of the district court outright on all of the 
propositions of error except for the judicially created grounds for vacatur—
holding that judicially created grounds for vacatur were eliminated by the 
Supreme Court in Hall Street.163 
IV. Analysis 
The Frazier court’s holding was incorrect because it improperly construed 
the scope of the Hall Street while ignoring the importance of judicially 
created grounds for vacatur to the vitality of the arbitration system.  As 
explored in more detail below, the Frazier court’s holding was incorrect for 
four main reasons.  First, the Hall Street decision did not compel the Frazier 
court to eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur.  Second, the Frazier 
court ignored the importance of judicially created grounds for vacatur as a 
mechanism for instilling confidence in the arbitration system and protecting 
the public from awards that pose a hazard to public safety.  Third, courts may 
rely on the contract law doctrines of unconscionability and public policy to 
support judicially created ground for vacatur because arbitration agreements 
are contracts.  Finally, the two policy justifications given by the Frazier court 
are unsubstantiated.  Specifically, there is no evidence that judicially created 
grounds for vacatur significantly affect judicial efficiency.  In addition, the 
FAA did not create a national policy favoring arbitration justifying the 
elimination of judicially created grounds for vacatur. Thus, a bright-line rule 
emerged from the Frazier decision, which eliminates the judicially-created 
grounds for vacatur, explicitly placing the importance of parties’ freedom of 
contract at a higher level than Congress intended when it implemented the 
FAA. 
A. Non-Statutory Grounds for Vacatur are Important to the Arbitration 
System 
In order for the FAA to effectively provide an efficient and predictable 
alternative to judicial adjudication, the judiciary must retain a check on 
arbitrators to ensure that the rights of individuals are protected.  While 
arbitration remains an effective method for resolving disputes, many cases 
have shown the necessity of review in order to protect both individual rights 
and public welfare.  As discussed above, non-statutory grounds for vacatur 
resulted from judicial discomfort with unjust arbitration awards.  At the most 
basic level, the reasons that non-statutory grounds for vacatur were created 
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have not changed: that is, to provide a safety valve in situations where the 
interest of justice and public safety necessitates vacating an arbitration award.   
1. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur are Important to Maintaining 
Confidence in the Arbitration System 
In a number of cases, the interest of justice requires vacation of an 
arbitration award on non-statutory grounds.164  Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. 
provides an example where the interest of justice required vacatur of a 
procedurally valid arbitration award.165  There, the Second Circuit vacated an 
arbitration award because the arbitrator refused to recognize that an employee 
had been discriminated against because of his age—even after an 
overwhelming amount of evidence pointing to discrimination had been 
presented.166  If the court had failed to step in to vacate the unjust award on 
non-statutory grounds, the employee would have had no recourse for his civil 
rights violation.  Additionally, deferential treatment by the court in such a 
circumstance would have sent a signal to arbitrators, businesses, and 
individuals alike that arbitrators are not bound by relevant judicial precedent 
and may “dispense [their] own brand of industrial justice.”167   
Two logical consequences would result from that signal.  First, when 
arbitration awards are not consistent with established legal norms, 
predictability is undermined.  It is clear that Congress enacted the FAA to 
respond to judicial hostility to arbitration by promoting predictability and 
ensuring that arbitration decisions reflect established law.168  This judicial 
hostility was based on the idea that arbitrators could not properly apply the 
law and make credible decisions.169  If arbitrators can depart from established 
law without review, the purpose of the FAA is undermined.  Of course, an 
unpredictable adjudication system is also undesirable because parties do not 
know what to expect and therefore cannot alter their behavior accordingly.  
Consequently, parties are likely to simply stop using arbitration agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 165. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 166. Id. at 204. 
 167. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 
(1960). 
 168. See Feigenbaum, supra note 92, at 876 (“Congress, by passing the [Federal 
Arbitration] Act, intended as its principal goal to give predictability to the legitimate 
expectations of those who agree to arbitration . . . .”); see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 
F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It has been made clear by the Supreme Court, this court and 
other courts that the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration is a thing of the past.”). 
 169. See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 13. 
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altogether because the courts, while more expensive, would offer 
substantially more predictability. 
Second, an arbitration system that does not reflect established legal norms 
will be perceived to be unfair.  In general, the law reflects established 
cumulative norms within our society.  Moreover, individuals, even losing 
parties, are comfortable with the finality of arbitration only when they are 
confident in the system.170  Therefore, deference to arbitrators who ignore 
legal norms and rely upon their own sense of fairness frustrates expectations 
of society.  In addition to the unpredictability of the system, parties will not 
want to defer to arbitrators whom they believe to be unfair and from whose 
decisions they cannot appeal. A system designed by Congress to offer a more 
efficient means of adjudication cannot accomplish its task if it is not used. 
Admittedly, most arbitrators will be fair and follow established social and 
legal norms.  If this were not so, then Congress would not have entrusted 
arbitrators with dispute resolution in the first place.  However, even a few 
examples of unjust arbitration decisions can undermine confidence in the 
entire system.  As discussed above, Congress did not provide statutory 
grounds to set aside all types of unjust awards.  Therefore, courts play a 
necessary role in maintaining the vitality of the arbitration system by 
exercising both statutory and judicially created grounds for vacatur.  As 
courts universally recognize, this role is rare and deferential; nevertheless, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s elimination of judicially created grounds for vacatur opens 
the door for an unpredictable and inefficient arbitration system. 
2. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur are an Important 
Comprehensive Public Policy Check on Arbitration Awards 
Non-statutory grounds for vacatur are also important to public policy—
including public safety—because an arbitrator’s role is simply to resolve the 
dispute presented, not to consider the effects of the decision.  Public policy 
grounds for vacatur were initially created in response to several cases where 
arbitrators reinstated unfit employees to safety-sensitive positions.171  The 
most notable of these cases is Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s 
Union.172  In that case, an arbitrator reinstated an Exxon Shipping employee 
after he was discharged for being intoxicated during his regularly scheduled 
shift.173  On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the award in order to advance 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A 
Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 180 (2002). 
 171. See supra Part II.D. 
 172. 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 173. Id. at 1190-91.  Remarkably, the incident occurred just six months after an intoxicated 
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protection of wildlife, resources, and public safety.174  Although the arbitrator 
correctly interpreted the collective bargaining agreement, it was incumbent 
upon the court to consider the interest of society as a whole.   
The increase in arbitration agreements makes it extremely important that 
courts have the ability to vacate arbitration awards when the award is 
contrary to prevailing public policy.  As a general matter, courts have always 
considered the public policy effects of their decisions, especially with regard 
to public safety.175  In Exxon Shipping Co., the arbitrator considered only the 
dispute; however, a holistic approach must be taken in order to prevent 
arbitration awards from contradicting sound public policy.  The Eleventh 
Circuit’s elimination of the public policy ground for vacatur diminishes the 
ability of a federal court to vacate an arbitration award that is contrary to 
public policy.  If arbitration awards contrary to public policy are confirmed, 
the court’s role in promoting good public policy will be subverted. 
The court’s role in promoting sound public policy goes beyond the 
resolution of a single dispute and into the theories behind our governmental 
institutions.  While a discussion of the purpose of the judicial system is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is widely accepted that the judicial branch 
should aspire to make common-law rules that advance the public good.  In 
fact, much of the judicial branch’s early hostility toward arbitration was 
based on the idea that it was too mechanical and unable to take into account 
the effects a decision may have on society as a whole.176  If courts are unable 
to vacate arbitration awards based on public policy concerns, the early fears 
of the judicial branch will be realized and there will be no comprehensive 
check on arbitration awards. 
3. Congressional Intent is Best Served by the Preservation of Non-
Statutory Grounds for Vacatur 
It is also reasonable to conclude that Congress has intended for public 
policy reasons for vacatur of arbitration awards to survive.  Non-statutory 
grounds for vacatur have been in use for over fifty years.177  During that time, 
                                                                                                                 
ship captain ran the Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker bound for California, into the Bligh Reef off 
Prince Williams Sound, Alaska.  Id. at 1194.  The accident was an environmental disaster 
which raised awareness about the culture of shipping industry employees and alcoholism. 
 174. Id. at 1196. 
 175. See Stewart E. Sterk, Commentary, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An 
Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 482 (1981). 
 176. Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or 
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986). 
 177. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). 
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there have been no attempts by Congress to amend § 10 of the FAA and 
declare the statutory grounds listed as the exclusive grounds for vacatur.178  In 
fact, Congress has amended the FAA five times since enacting the FAA in 
1925—amending § 10 as recently as 1990.179  Additionally, it is hard to 
imagine that Congress intended the likely dangerous and unjust results that 
would have been reached in Exxon Shipping Co. and Halligan in the absence 
of non-statutory grounds for vacatur.  Congress did not intend a system that 
would endanger the public or allow patently unjust results; therefore, the 
preservation and exercise of non-statutory grounds for vacatur best serve 
congressional intent.   
At a time when docket control complicates judicial efficiency, arbitration 
proves an invaluable asset.180  Like other areas of law, including contract law, 
arbitration must be subject to control beyond the will of the parties or the 
judgment of arbitrators.  Arbitration requires judicial safety valves in order to 
avoid awards that undermine justice and public safety.181   
B. Contract Law as a Model for Judicial Safeguards 
Arbitration is a creature of contract law; thus some similar themes exist.182  
Judicially created safeguards in arbitration mirror judicially created grounds 
for contract avoidance.  The law of contracts includes a number of judicially 
created reasons to prohibit the enforcement of contracts, including public 
policy and unconscionability.183  Just as the FAA is a provision that governs 
the enforcement of arbitration awards, the law of contracts is an elaborate 
framework designed to enforce contractual agreements.184  Although caveat 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Thomas E. Carbonneau, "Arbitracide": The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in 
the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 233, 278 (2007) (“Title 9, U.S.C. §§ 1-14, was 
first enacted Feb. 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669), and 
amended September 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233). Chapter 2 was added July 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 
692). Two new sections, both initially denominated 15 and later corrected to 15 and 16, were 
passed by the U.S. Congress in October 1988. The renumbering took place on December 1, 
1990 (Pub. L. Nos. 669 and 702); Chapter 3 was added on August 15, 1990 (Pub. L. Nos. 
101-369); and § 10 was amended on November 15, 1990.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived “Bureaucracy” of the 
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 
IOWA L. REV. 871, 930-36 (1983). 
 181. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 182. See, e.g., E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 183. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 585, 
632 (6th ed. 2007). 
 184. See generally id. 
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emptor is a theme that is present in the law of contracts,185 courts have 
routinely carved out exceptions in the enforcement of contracts in order to 
protect the parties from the dangers involved with unfettered contract 
enforcement.186  At the start of the twentieth century, courts developed 
common law exceptions to the general rule of caveat emptor.187  In many 
situations, contracts seemed unfair as written, even though all of the parties 
agreed to the contractual terms and there were no procedural deficiencies in 
the contract formation.188  These unfair contracts made courts uncomfortable 
enforcing the substantive terms of otherwise valid contracts—leading to the 
creation of common-law exceptions to contract enforcement.189  In sum, 
courts were uncomfortable with blind enforcement of the provisions of 
contracts merely because parties agreed to those provisions. 
Since “arbitration is a creature of contract,” the law of contracts should 
govern it.190  Judicial discomfort with enforcement of unjust contracts is 
analogous to the discomfort courts experienced with the enforcement of 
unjust arbitration awards prior to the recognition of judicially created grounds 
for vacatur.  Because the law of contracts recognizes judicially created 
safeguards designed to avoid the enforcement of unjust contracts, freedom of 
contract does not justify the Frazier court’s express repudiation of the 
judicially created grounds for vacatur.  The lack of logical policy justification 
for the elimination of judicially created grounds is particularly troubling 
given the limited scope of Hall Street.   
 
C. Hall Street Should be Read Narrowly 
1.  Frazier and Hall Street are Factually Distinguishable 
The Frazier court incorrectly applied Hall Street to the case because the 
facts and issues in Frazier were not analogous to those in Hall Street.  The 
Frazier court was specifically faced with the issue of whether judicially 
created grounds for vacatur were available to the Fraziers.  The Fraziers 
alleged that the district court erred when it refused to vacate their award in 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (Danaher, J., dissenting). 
 186. See generally KNAPP ET AL., supra note 183, at 585. 
 187. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 450; Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773 (Wash. 
2004); Higgins v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 300-01 (Ct. App. 2006).  
 188. See E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.28, 298-99 (4th ed. 2004). 
 189. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 183, at 585, 632. 
 190. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 
269 F.3d 187, 194-95  (3d Cir. 2001). 
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part because “the arbitrator’s decision was contrary to public policy and 
[was] made in manifest disregard of the law.”191  The Fraziers failed to raise 
any proposition of error alleging a contractually expanded review, nor does 
the record indicate that the parties contracted to expand the scope of review 
under the FAA.192  Thus, Frazier can be factually and legally distinguished 
from Hall Street because Hall Street involved the contractual expansion of 
the grounds for vacatur under the FAA.193  Nevertheless, this distinction can 
be overcome if Hall Street can be interpreted broadly enough to cover all 
grounds for vacatur under the FAA.  But it cannot.  
2. The Intended Scope of Hall Street 
As the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the law, the meaning of 
Hall Street is essential in determining if judicially created grounds for vacatur 
exist under the FAA.194  If Hall Street expressly limited the grounds for 
vacatur under the FAA to §§ 9 and 10, then the circuit courts of appeal would 
have no choice but to follow precedent and declare judicially created grounds 
for vacatur void.195  However, if Hall Street applied only to the contractual 
expansion of the grounds for review under the FAA, then it would not apply 
to Frazier.  In order to determine whether the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was 
based on binding precedent, the scope of the Hall Street holding must be 
explored.   
The Hall Street opinion did not expressly eliminate judicially created 
grounds for vacatur.196  The holding in Hall Street was directed at the 
contracting parties’ ability to contractually expand the depth of review 
provided by a federal court.197  The basic and fundamental question addressed 
by the Court was whether parties may contractually expand the standard of 
review beyond what is provided for by the FAA.198  The Court answered this 
question negatively, holding that §§ 9 and 10 are the exclusive grounds for 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 192. Id. at 1320-21. 
 193. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). 
 194. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 195. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Where prior panel 
precedent conflicts with a subsequent Supreme Court decision, we follow the Supreme Court 
decision.”) (citing Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1992)).  
 196. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 n.3 (2010); 
Hall St., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).  
 197. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 581 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether the grounds for 
vacatur and modification provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive.”). 
 198. Id. 
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vacatur under the FAA.199  Next, the Court engaged in a discussion of 
judicially created grounds for review in the context of contractually expanded 
grounds for vacatur—above and beyond the statutorily created grounds in the 
FAA.200  However, the Court’s discussion was limited to contractual 
expansion of the grounds for review.201  The Court discussed manifest 
disregard by citing the petitioner’s contention that “if judges can add grounds 
to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties.”202  This language makes it 
clear that the Court was specifically referring to a party’s right to 
contractually expand the level of review, not to the non-statutory grounds for 
vacatur. 
As noted previously, Stolt-Nielsen suggests that the Court did not intend to 
address the issue of judicially created grounds for vacatur when it decided 
Hall Street.203  The Court explicitly stated, “We do not decide whether 
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as an 
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated 
grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”204  Therefore, the issue is left 
to the circuits because the Supreme Court has confirmed that it has not 
spoken on that issue.205  Because Hall Street did not eliminate the judicially 
created grounds for vacatur, the Circuit Courts are free to decide these issues 
considering the law in their circuit and policy rationale. 
Because Hall Street does not apply to the judicially created grounds for 
vacatur addressed in Frazier, the Eleventh Circuit should have instead looked 
to circuit precedent.  Prior decisions of the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally 
recognized judicially created grounds for vacatur under the FAA.206  Even the 
Frazier court acknowledged the existence of non-statutory grounds for 
vacatur.207  Citing B.L. Harbert International, the Frazier court recognized a 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. at 576. 
 200. Id. at 584-85. 
 201. Robert Ellis, Recent Developments, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in 
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 205. See United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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long history that supported the use of judicially created grounds for vacatur in 
the Eleventh Circuit.208  Therefore, circuit law opposes Frazier, leaving only 
policy justifications as a rationale for departure from prior jurisprudence. 
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Policy Rationale is Misplaced 
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Frazier was not a product of stare 
decisis; rather, the holding was based on flawed policy justifications.  One of 
the most valuable assets that reviewing courts have is their ability to consider 
the changing effects of the rule of law.209  Ignoring the misinterpretation of 
Hall Street by the Eleventh Circuit—concluding that Hall Street mandated 
the elimination of non-statutory grounds for vacatur—it is possible that the 
Frazier court saw the Hall Street opinion as a call to reconsider the 
usefulness of judicially created grounds for vacatur.  In order to properly 
analyze the merits of the decision, the policy rationale cited by the Frazier 
court must be examined.  The court relied on the policy goals of judicial 
efficiency and arbitration award finality. The court discussed these issues 
through the lens of Hall Street and cited the Supreme Court’s opinion.210   
1. Non-Statutory Grounds for Vacatur Do Not Undermine Judicial 
Efficiency 
The Frazier court’s judicial efficiency and arbitration award finality 
justification has merit on its face because both of these values are important 
to the effectiveness of the arbitration system under the FAA.  The court 
recognized the need for arbitration awards to be final.211  If arbitration awards 
can simply be appealed to the federal district court and receive a full merits 
hearing, then the purpose of arbitration is frustrated because there would be 
little chance for parties to avoid litigation.212  It was logical for the Frazier 
court to protect the finality of awards; however, most commentators were 
satisfied with the finality of arbitration awards even with the availability of 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. (citing B.L. Harbert Int’l, 441 F.3d at 910).  
 209. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 210. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1322 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 
588 (2008)). 
 211. Id.;  see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 204 F.3d 523, 527 (4th 
Cir. 2000); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(observing that “a restrictive standard of review is necessary to . . . prevent arbitration from 
becoming a ‘preliminary step to judicial resolution’”) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. 
Grasselli Emps. Indep. Ass’n, 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
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judicially created grounds for vacatur so long as the standard for setting aside 
the awards remained stringent.213 
The need to protect finality of arbitration awards is not sufficient to justify 
eliminating judicially created grounds for vacatur.  A study conducted in 
2006 revealed that arbitration awards are confirmed at a rate of ninety percent 
in federal courts across the United States.214  The study also found that among 
all arbitration awards vacated, in both state and federal court, only four 
percent can be attributed to non-statutory grounds for vacatur.215  This can be 
explained by the significant burden that must be met in order to meet the 
prima facie case for non-statutory vacatur.216  The rigid standards and low 
success rates associated with petitions for vacatur on non-statutory grounds 
provide evidence that the existence of these grounds does not undermine the 
goal of judicial efficiency.  
2. Illusory Policy: There Is No National Policy Favoring Arbitration 
Since many courts and commentators believe the primary point of the 
FAA and the “national policy favoring arbitration” is to avoid time-
consuming, expensive, merits adjudications, it is not completely irrational to 
explore the possibility that eliminating judicially created grounds for vacatur 
would be a sensible way of promoting judicial efficiency.217  However, there 
is some debate about the underlying value that drives such strict adherence to 
arbitration awards—“the national policy favoring arbitration.”218 
In support of its holding, the Frazier court reasoned there is a “national 
policy favoring arbitration.”219 Therefore, it is important to explore the notion 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Summer 2005, at 23, 25 (finding that manifest disregard was only successful four percent of the 
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 214. Mills, supra note 213, at 25. 
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that the FAA created a policy that favors arbitration. This notion originated in 
the dicta of early arbitration cases, but is nowhere in the FAA.220  The FAA 
does not, implicitly or explicitly, declare a national policy favoring 
arbitration; instead, the FAA simply provides a framework for enforcing 
arbitration awards.221  In addition, the legislative history reveals that the plain 
focus of the FAA at the time of passage was to make arbitration awards 
enforceable in federal courts by statutorily eliminating a common law 
doctrine that disfavored arbitration.222  This distinction is subtle, but if the 
courts are going to eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur on the 
basis that the FAA’s policy requires the courts to favor arbitration, then it is 
important to question that assumption. 
Many courts have challenged the existence of a national policy favoring 
arbitration.223  Instead of viewing the FAA as a statement by Congress in 
favor of arbitration, those courts focus on the elimination of judicial hostility 
toward arbitration.224  In Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that there is no national policy 
favoring arbitration.225  In reality, the FAA acts as a mechanism to eliminate 
judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.226  Although the Supreme 
Court’s language in Hall Street suggests that there is in fact a national policy 
favoring arbitration, more recent opinions by the Court call that assumption 
                                                                                                                 
needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.’”)(internal 
citations omitted). 
 220. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 
(1924))(exploring the legislative history of the FAA making it clear that Congress’s intent in 
passing the FAA was simply “to place ‘[a]n arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as 
other contracts, where it belongs.”). 
 221. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). 
 222. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (“The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable 
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the 
jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be subject to litigation in the Federal courts . . . [t]he 
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 223. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 
(1989); Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009); see 
also Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009). 
 224. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 666. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
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into question.227  In Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, the Court clarified 
federal policy by explaining that the goal of the FAA is “to place [arbitration] 
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”228  Even in recent 
Supreme Court cases, such as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which 
boldly tout the national policy favoring arbitration, the explanation of what 
the national policy favoring arbitration means contradicted the very idea that 
arbitration is favored. 229  In Concepcion, the Court explained that the federal 
policy favoring arbitration simply means “courts must place arbitration 
agreements on equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them 
according to their terms.” 230  In sum, the national policy favoring contract 
enforcement includes arbitration contracts. The federal policy toward 
arbitration is equal treatment and enforcement of arbitration contracts, not 
promotion of arbitration.  As explained in Gotham Holdings, parties do not 
violate or undermine the integrity and utility of arbitration by litigating 
instead of arbitrating.231  The absence of a national policy favoring arbitration 
undermines the primary policy justification advanced by the Frazier court for 
eliminating non-statutory grounds for vacatur. 
V. Conclusion 
The validity of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA is 
important to the vitality of the arbitration system.  If arbitration agreements 
are given nearly unfettered deference by the courts, the result will 
undoubtedly be unjust arbitration awards and the erosion of confidence in the 
arbitration system.  The Frazier decision places the arbitration system at risk 
by relying on the limited scope of Hall Street and flawed policy justifications 
to support its holding.  Hall Street applies only to circumstances where 
parties have contractually expanded the grounds for vacatur, not as a mandate 
for the elimination of judicially created grounds for vacatur.  The policies 
underlying the Frazier decision are also flawed because of two 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 577 (2008); AT&T Mobility 
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fundamentally erroneous assumptions: (1) non-statutory grounds for vacatur 
undermine judicial efficiency and (2) the FAA enacted a national policy 
favoring arbitration.  Both of these assumptions are incorrect.  While finality 
is an important value, it cannot be advanced at the expense of ensuring that 
arbitration awards are just and do not violate public policy.  Instead, the same 
approach taken with regard to contracts should be maintained in the 
arbitration system—courts should have safety valves in order to avoid 
confirmation of unjust awards.  Just as these safety valves have not 
undermined freedom of contract, evidence suggests they do not undermine 
the arbitration system.  Therefore, non-statutory grounds for vacatur under 
the FAA should be maintained in order to ensure that courts have a legal 
basis for vacating arbitrary arbitration awards.   
 
Sean C. Wagner  
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